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Abstract 
As interest margins of credit institutions affect economic performance of countries, finding out which are the 
main determinants of their evolution is a research task of great interest at current times. This is the purpose of  
the present paper as regards to the Spanish case over the period 2004–2012. Based on the econometric contribu-
tions by Ho and Saunders (1981) and some of its extensions, the authors develop a model that includes as expla-
natory variables the factors usually examined in the literature and other singular variables that might be relevant. 
Particularly, the rate of leverage, the quality of their assets measured according to their risk, and the profit ob-
tained from the selling of assets, including real estate ones. The research also provides an analysis of differences 
between banks and savings banks. 
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Introduction1 
Among the traditional functions of credit institu-
tions, a key one is that of capturing funds from 
savers to offer them to those in need of funding. 
Obviously, in a market economy, the interests 
paid to savers are usually lower than those 
charged to debtors. This provides credit entities 
with positive interest margins that help them in 
their permanent attempt to cover costs, including 
capital costs arising from depreciation, and also pay 
dividends. 
The purpose of the present paper consists in in-
vestigating how did interest margins of banks in 
fact evolved in Spain over the period 2004–2012, 
for, then, estimating with econometric techniques, 
which may have been the main determinants of 
the abovementioned evolution. 
Figure 1 shows the said evolution of the average inter-
est rate charged and paid by the Spanish credit institu-
tions over the 2004–2012 period investigated, as well 
as the average interest margin. As showed, the average 
margin appears quite stable over more than half of the 
years considered (1.51% in 2004 to 1.58% in 2007), 
then, grows over the period 2008–2010 (1.68% in 
2008 to 2.63% in 2010), to finally start reducing slow-
ly in 2011 (2.62%) and substantially in 2012 (1.90%). 
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What are, then, the main factors explaining  
such an evolution? For answering this question, 
we have to start from the work of Ho and Saund-
ers (1981). However, we will develop a model 
that includes as explanatory variables not only 
those factors usually examined in the literature, 
but also some other singular variables that have 
not received enough attention. Therefore, besides 
those traditional factors, we will also test as po-
tential determinants three additional variables that 
might be relevant for the Spanish case: the rate of 
leverage, the quality of their assets measured ac-
cording to their risk, and the profit they obtain 
from the sale of assets, including those real estate 
properties in which they invested over the boom. 
We also provide an analysis showing some differ-
ences between banks and savings banks. In addi-
tion, we will also test separately each of the four 
sources of income not linked with the interest 
margin, that is, we will differentiate between in-
comes obtained from capital investments, from 
commissions, from financial investments (pur-
chase-sale of financial instruments) and from  
other income sources. 
The research results provided by our study as re-
gards to saving banks, in the Spanish case, as 
compared to banks, may be of some interest too 
for those countries in which saving banks still 
share a significant quota of the intermediation 
market, as is the case of Germany, for example. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion 1 gives a brief review of key publications on 
these issues. In section 2, we explain the model 
and the variables to be tested, as well as the ex-
pected sign of the coefficient in each case. In sec-
tion 3 we explain the results obtained. Finally, last 
section provides some concluding remarks. 
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Fig. 1. Nominal averages of interest rates and interest margins of banks in Spain (2004–2012) 
1. Background 
Ho and Saunders (1981) on a sample of the Ameri-
can banks developed a model in which the interest 
margin depends on four factors: the degree of risk 
aversion, the structure of the market, the average 
size of banking transactions and the variation of the 
interest rate applied to loans and deposits. Several 
authors have made extensions of this model by in-
corporating new variables and testing them with 
samples from several countries. 
As some other features and results are synthetically 
presented in Table 1, we briefly mention that some 
of these contributions over the 1990s were Wong 
(1997), which contains an extended theoretical mod-
el, Angbazo (1997), which focuses on the American 
banks during the period 1989–1993, and Demirgüç-
Kunt and Huizinga (1999), which is an international 
study using a large amount of variables. 
Over the 2000s, several other contributions follow-
ing the line of Ho and Saunders must be mentioned. 
The research by Saunders and Schmacher (2000) 
contains a study about several countries, including 
Spain, covering the period 1988–1995. Martinez 
Peric and Mody (2004) give special emphasis to 
highlighting differences regarding national and for-
eign banks in Latin American countries. As regards 
to the European financial institutions, Maudos and 
Fernandez de Guevara (2004) is another prominent 
example. Carbo Valverde and Rodriguez Fernandez 
(2007) do so for the period 1994–2001. Kasman, 
Tunc, Vardar and Okan (2010) also studied the case 
of European countries during the period 1995–2006.  
More recently, Williams (2007) has emphasized the 
differences between domestic and foreign banks as 
regards to the Australian banks over the period 
1989–2001. Hawtrey and Liang (2008) investigate 
the case in fourteen OECD countries during the 
period 1987–2001. Claeys and Vennet (2008) focus 
on European banks over the period 1994–2001. Al-
so, Maudos and Solis (2009) do the same in the case 
of Mexico for the period 1993–2005, and Horvath 
(2009) examines the case of the Czech banks. The 
case of credit institutions in Eastern Europe is pro-
gressively gaining more and more attention, with 
new variables being tested, as indicated in Table 1. 
Schwaiger and Liebeg (2008) and Poghosyan (2010) 
are examples of this. Fungacova and Poghosyan 
(2011) focus on the Russian banks during the period 
1999–2007. 
De Yong and Tara (2004a, 2004b and 2004c) focus on 
several determinants affecting the evolution of in-
comes regarding US banks over the last decade of the 
twentieth century. In the first one, they mainly study 
how deregulation and technological change affected 
the capacity of those banks for obtaining incomes, 
whereas, in the second one, they specifically focus on 
the determinants of the increase registered in non-
financial incomes. In the third article, some new fac-
tors potentially affecting the evolution of those non-
financial incomes over the said period are tested. 
Finally, Nguyen (2012) examines the case for 28 
countries that experience financial liberalization 
reforms over the period 1997–2004; Lin, Chung, 
Hsieh, and Wu (2012) examined the period 1997–
2005 in the case of the Asian banks. 
Table 1 summarizes the variables tested in all of 
these articles also indicating the signs of regression 
coefficients obtained in each case, the R2 obtained 
for each of them, the period investigated, the area, 
and the econometric regression approach performed. 
The above literature review also allows us to extract 
some other conclusions. On the one hand, we find that 
the weight interest margin has on total income has 
consistently diminished throughout the years in all the 
countries and, on the other hand, they also reveal that 
differences among countries are fewer and fewer. If the 
income obtained through the interest margin 
represented around 80% of total incomes in the early 
1990s (Wong, 1996), over the 2000s, this source has 
represented only about half of total income on average. 
Obviously, other sources of income have seen their 
share increased in developed countries. Some exam-
ples of these other sources are: commissions, divi-
dends, capital gains obtained from the selling of finan-
cial assets, income obtained from the selling of non-
financial services and income coming from real estate 
speculative transactions, from investment in fixed and 
variable income securities. 
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2. Methodological issues 
2.1. Data and model. The sample used for our study 
is formed by all savings banks (47), as well as the 
most representative banks (14) operating in Spain at 
the beginning of the study (2004) together with all 
the new entities created as a result of the intense 
restructuring process implemented in the Spanish 
financial system over the last years (see Climent and 
Pavia, 2015). Credit institutions that make up the 
sample represent 95% of the total activity in Spain. 
In particular, our study is based on the activity of a 
total of seventy-five credit entities over nine time 
periods: 2004–2012. For so doing, we have com-
piled a dataset of non-balanced panel data. 
This allows for building a more informative data-
base than databases just based on sectional informa-
tion, because it presents more variability, less co-
linearity and more degrees of freedom, making it 
possible to take into account both the time and 
cross-sectional dimensions of the data by means of a 
non-balanced panel data econometric model. This, 
no doubt, will result in more efficient regression 
estimators and, overall, will allow us to better con-
trol for endogeneity and/or possible heterogeneity 
not individually observed.  
The model has been estimated through the ordinary 
least squares (OLS) technique. As we use panel 
data, the Hausman’s test has been employed for 
deciding which model is best fitted. As a result, we 
have chosen a model with fixed effects. 
This also allows us to control for the possibility that 
each credit institution might have singular non-
measurable, non-observable characteristics that might 
influence the relationship between interest margin 
and determinants. In our model, we have also intro-
duced individual effects of the type: αi=α+νi . And 
have added some more variables than is usual in pre-
vious studies in order to obtain a more complete view 
of the various determinants potentially affecting the 
evolution of interest margins. Some of these variables 
might have been used as control variables (for exam-
ple, the GDP). However, we decided to test the effect 
of these variables too for two main reasons: (i) firstly, 
for detecting the whole effect of all variables in a 
complete model that includes both internal variables 
(obtained from the balance sheet, the profits and 
losses account, etc.) and external ones (including 
variables of a different kind: some microeconomic, 
others of a macroeconomic nature), and (ii) second, 
for being able to extend the basic model and build 
some others containing interactions. 
In particular, the model specification is as follows: 
Interest marginit = αi + ∑βExplanatory variablesit + 
+ ωit  .                                                                      (1) 
2.2. Variables. The dependent variable is the inter-
est margin, which is defined as the difference be-
tween interests paid and charged. Concerning the 
explanatory variables, in our model, we differentiate 
between explanatory variables that are internal to the 
credit entity from those that are external. 
2.2.1. Internal variables. As internal variables, we 
have considered the following four groups: 1) struc-
ture of property, 2) extraordinary profits, 3) quality 
of the credit entity itself and 4) determinants ob-
tained from the balance sheet information, both re-
garding assets and liabilities. 
A) Structure of the property 
Type: savings bank/bank. Dummy variable. For bank, 
we attribute a value of 1, and for saving bank, a value 
of 0. A positive sign for the coefficient would indicate 
that the interest margin is greater in banks. 
B) Determinants obtained from the balance sheet 
Liquidity/total assets. This ratio is formed by the most 
liquid assets as a share of total assets. As these types of 
assets do not generate incomes, the expected sign of 
this coefficient would be negative (Lin et al., 2012; 
Fungačova and Poghosyan, 2011). 
Loans/total assets. Following Garcia-Herrero et al. 
(2009) and Kasman et al. (2010), we can expect 
higher interest margin the higher its loan portfolio is 
in relation to their total assets. 
Deposits/total assets. This ratio is formed by the 
amount of deposits owed by credit institutions as a 
share of their total assets. As known, deposits represent 
a cheaper and more stable financial source than the 
alternatives (Claeys and Bennett, 2008; Garcia-Herrero 
et al., 2009). So, we expect a positive sign. 
Own funds/total assets. This ratio is formed by the 
credit institutions own funds divided by their total 
assets. According to Ho and Saunders (1981), Ang-
bazo (1997), Saunders and Schumacher (2000), 
Maudos and Fernandez de Guevara (2004), Wil-
liams (2007) and Solis Maudos (2009), Kasman et 
al. (2010), Fungačova, and Poghosyan (2011), Lin et 
al. (2012), negative sign is expected. 
C) Determinants from the incomes 
Capital yields/total assets. This is a ratio formed by 
the income obtained from investments in capital 
stocks divided by total assets.  
Yields from financial operations/total assets. Income 
obtained by financial operations regarding the pur-
chase and sale of all kinds of financial assets as a 
share of total assets.  
Other operating income/total assets. This is the 
difference between income and cost stemming from 
non-financial activities as a share of total assets. 
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By increasing investment in these three variables, 
investment in loans will decrease by decreasing the 
percentage of credits on the asset and, thus, the in-
terest margin should decrease. 
Net commissions/total assets. Income from commis-
sion as a share of total assets. 
D) Determinants from the expenditures-costs
Administrative expenditures/total assets. This variable 
is measured as the sum of the administrative costs, 
including personnel, divided by total assets. The sign 
of this coefficient is expected to be positive, as greater 
material and professional capacity are often associated 
with better quality of services. 
Efficiency ratio. This ratio results from dividing the 
cost of administration by the profit gross margin. The 
lower the ratio, the greater the efficiency of credit insti-
tutions. The expected sign of the coefficient would in 
this case be negative. According to Angbazo (1997), 
Maudos and Fernandez de Guevara (2004), Williams 
(2007), Maudos and Solis (2009) and Kasman et al 
(2010), we can expect that credit institutions with 
higher quality management will be able to perform a 
more efficient and profitable management. 
E) Extraordinary results
Yields from the sale of assets/total assets. This vari-
able represents the result obtained from the selling 
of assets as a share of total assets. The sign of the 
coefficient for this variable is undetermined, because 
it has no direct influence on the margin. 
F) Quality of the entity
Non-performing loan rate. This delinquency rate 
shows the amount of non-performing loans as a 
share of total assets. Credit institutions that have a 
higher delinquency rate will be experiencing a re-
duction in the amount of interest received from these 
non-performing loans, which may affect negatively 
their interest margins. The sign of this variable will 
be negative. 
Risk weighted assets ratio. This variable is the ratio 
upon which credit institutions calculate the mini-
mum amount of resources needed to fill the solven-
cy ratio. The price of the assets, i.e., the interest 
charged by credit institutions, is inversely related to 
the risk. By increasing the quality, the ratio decreas-
es and the interest margin decreases.  
Leverage ratio. This ratio is formed by the amount 
of loans given to customers divided by the amount 
of deposits obtained from customers. The entities 
with greater amount of loans we can expect higher 
interest margins. 
2.2.3. External variables. 
A) Macro variables
Consumer Price Index. Regarding prices, we use the 
Spanish consumer price index. It is expected that as 
inflation increases, the margin will increase (Marti-
nez and Mody, 2004; Claeys and Vander, 2008; and 
Maudos and Solis, 2009). 
Interest Rate (Euribor 12M). The expected sign, as 
Williams (2007) states, is positive, because the greater 
the 12-month Euribor, the greater the interest margin. 
GDP rate of growth. This ratio refers to real GDP 
growth annual rate. In this case, the expected sign of 
the coefficient is positive. 
B) Micro variables
Market power. This ratio is calculated, according to 
Nguyen (2012) and Williams (2007), as the squared 
ratio that is formed by the total amount of deposits 
of each entity divided by the total amount of depo-
sits of the sector. The greater the market power, the 
higher the interest margin (Williams, 2007; Kasman 
et al., 2010; and Fungačova and Poghosyan, 2011). 
Therefore, the expected sign is positive. 
Size. We calculate the size as the logarithm of total 
assets of the entity and its sign is negative. Increas-
ing the size produces economies of scale and can 
reduce the margin. 
3. Results
3.1. Descriptive results. Table 2 provides a descrip-
tive summary of the variables tested, including the 
results obtained testing the differences between the 
means of banks and savings banks. 
3.2. Econometric results. Table 3 presents the 
main results obtained through the regressions. We 
have checked for co-linearity and for correlation 
between variables and have found no problem. We 
have also performed two types of regressions. The 
first one using as explanatory factors the set of 
variables described in subsection 2.2. In the 
second regression, the ROA (return on assets) has 
been added as a new explanatory variable. The 
results found indicate that both models are good 
estimators of the interest margin of the Spanish 
credit institutions over the period studied, with an 
adjusted R2 that is greater than 0.90 in both cases. 
The statistical Durbin-Watson tells us that resi-
duals show no autocorrelation. The model has 
been estimated considering fixed individual ef-
fects. The results obtained from the Hausman test 
guarantees the consistency and greater efficiency 
of the fixed individual effects estimator. 
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Table 2. Descriptive summary of the interest margin determinants for the Spanish credit institutions  
(2004–2012) 
  All Savings bank Bank   Dif S/B 
  Mean Std. Dev. n Mean Std. Dev. n Mean Std. Dev. n Gap Sig.  






0.62% *** B 
Liquidity  8.15% 1.18% 5.99% 0.96% 9.33% 1.59% 3.34% *** B 
Loans/total assets 63.44% 8.07% 67.88% 7.04% 61.00% 10.26% -6.88% *** S 
Deposits/total assets 49.53% 14.21% 58.28% 11.23% 44.73% 12.65% -13.55% *** S 
Own funds/total assets 5.48% 2.41% 5.05% 2.35% 5.72% 2.57% 0.67% ** B 
Capital yields/total assets 0.07% 0.11% 0.11% 0.12% 0.05% 0.03% -0.06% *** S 
Net commissions/total assets 0.65% 0.20% 0.43% 0.13% 0.78% 0.24% 0.34% *** B 
Yields from financial operations/t.a. 0.24% 0.41% 0.25% 0.24% 0.23% 0.67% -0.01%  S 
Other operating income/t.a. 0.07% 0.18% 0.12% 0.17% 0.05% 0.17% -0.07% *** S 
Administrative expenditures/t.a. 1.21% 0.37% 1.08% 0.35% 1.29% 0.42% 0.20% *** S 
Efficiency ratio  44.03% 14.44% 47.82% 13.74% 42.47% 15.99% -5.35% *** S 
Yields from the sale of assets/t.a. 0.11% 0.17% 0.11% 0.17% 0.12% 0.18% 0.01%  B 
Non-performing loans 2.40% 2.74% 3.03% 2.84% 2.05% 2.47% -0.97% *** B 
Risk weighted assets 60.04% 32.67% 59.47% 32.75% 64.79% 32.40% 5.33%  S 
Leverage ratio 128.08% 31.38% 116.48% 20.31% 136.37% 38.52% 19.89% *** B 
Market power 0.003% 0.018% 0.001% 0.002% 0.010% 0.033% 0.010% *** B 
Size of activities 16.60 1.58 16.34 1.39 17.31 1.83 0.97 *** B 
ROA  0.69% 1.75% 0.30% 1.59% 0.91% 2.12% 0.61% *** B 
 
In addition, in order to take into account potential 
differences between different types of entities, we 
have also analyzed whether the impact of each de-
terminant is more different in savings banks than in 
banks. To do this, we have estimated the same pre-
vious model, but additionally introduced the interac-
tion each component has with the variable type. If 
the coefficient we estimate in the model with inte-
ractions appears significant for a factor, this means 
that the impact of this factor upon banks and savings 
banks interest margins is not the same. If positive, 
this would indicate that the impact in the case of 
banks is higher than in the case of savings banks and 
vice versa. If the coefficient shows up non-
significant, this would indicate that there are no 
differences in the role each determinant plays in the 
case of banks versus savings banks. 
3.2.1. Structure of the property. In the first model, 
the dummy variable has proved to be significant and 
with a positive sign, which indicates that under simi-
lar circumstances, banks obtain a higher interest 
margin than savings banks. This finding is consis-
tent with the fact that most public funding used for 
the financial bailouts in Spain was directed to the 
savings banks. 
Table 3. Regression models 
 Variables Base With ROA With interactions Elasticity 
  
Constant 
0.014 0.013 0.017***   
 
  (0.009) (0.009) (0.001)   
Structure of the property Savings bank – bank 
0.004** 0.004**   
Bank  
(0.002) (0.002)   
 Balance sheet  
Liquidity/total assets 
0.011 0.011 -0.009   
0.011 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.022)   
Loans/total assets 
0.003 0.003 0.005   
0.129 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.009)   
Deposits/total assets 
0.008** 0.008** 0.011   
0.315 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.011)   
Own funds/total assets 
0.008 0.008 0.020   
0.029 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.023)   
Incomes  
Capital yields/total assets 
-0.453*** -0.453*** 0.2776   
-0.023 
(0.127) (0.127) (0.870)   
Net commissions/total assets 
-0.224* -0.223* 0.173   
-0.066 
(0.116) (0.116) (0.285)   
Yields from financial operations/t.a. 
-0.126*** -0.127 -0.077* 
Savings bank -0.018 
(0.022) (0.023) (0.044) 
 Other operating income/total assets 
-0.265* -0.267*** -0.581*** 
Savings bank -0.018 
(0.057) (0.058) (0.187) 
Banks and Bank Systems, Volume 12, Issue 2, 2017
44 
Table 3. (cont.) Regression models 







Efficiency ratio  
-0.010*** -0.010*** -0.006**
Savings bank -0.313 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
Extraordinary results 





Quality of the entity 






















GDP rate of growth 
-0.071*** -0.071*** -0.087***







Size of activities 
-0.001* -0.001 -0.002***
Savings bank -0,060 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ROA 0.002 0.019 
0,001 
(0.007) (0.018) 
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 449 
Cross-sections included: 75 Periods included: 9 N=449 
Adjusted R-squared 0,908839 0,908595 0,800514 
Durbin-Watson stat 1,806227 1,806516 1,629401 
Significant levels: *** 1 percent;* * 5 percent; * 10 percent 
 Standard errors are in parentheses 
Method: Panel Least Squares. Cross-section fixed (dummy variables) 
3.2.2. Balance sheet. Concerning the balance sheet 
variables, only one of them has proved to be signifi-
cant: the ratio deposits/total assets. And the sign of 
the coefficient is positive. Lower weight of deposits 
in total assets is associated with lower interest mar-
gin. As known, the weight deposits have in total 
assets is being decreased since the mid-1990s, in 
part due to the greater access these entities have to 
international wholesale markets. This means that 
interest margin has evolved in the same direction, 
negatively affecting profitability of Spanish credit 
institutions. The evolution of this ratio from the 
balance sheet over the period examined contributed 
to the severe financial crisis registered in Spain. 
3.2.3. Incomes. Regarding the income variables. The 
four variables studied (capital gains, commissions, 
profits from financial operations, and other operat-
ing income) have proved to be significant and with a 
negative sign. This means that greater diversification 
regarding the income sources translates to lower 
interest margin. Therefore, we can conclude that 
even if a structural change consisting of a greater
diversification of income sources has taken place, 
this has not prevented the reduction registered in the 
interest margin of Spanish credit institutions over 
the period examined. 
3.2.4. Expenditures-costs. The results we have ob-
tained concerning the expenditures-costs related va-
riables are interesting too. The two variables studied 
appear significant. The sign for the efficiency rate has 
come out to be negative. Greater efficiency ratios are 
then, associated with lower interest margins, although 
the coefficient is very small (-0.010). In this case, our 
conclusion is in line with those of Maudos et al. 
(2004), Williams (2007), Claeys and Bennett (2008), 
Schwaiger et al. (2008), Hawtrey and Liang (2008), 
Maudos and Solis ( 2009), Kasman et al. (2010). 
The result obtained as regards to administration costs is 
also informative. The sign of the coefficient here is 
positive and its magnitude is the biggest one of all the 
variables we have tested as share of total assets 
(1.023). Therefore, higher costs of administration, 
including personnel, appear associated with substan-
tially higher interest margins.  
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As an intensive reduction in personnel has taken 
place over the period studied, this costs savings faci-
litates the reduction of the interest margin of credit 
institutions, then contributing to increase competi-
tiveness of the Spanish economy if firms get exter-
nal financial resources at a lower cost. However, the 
significant reduction in jobs that has taken place as a 
result of the already mentioned bailouts and restruc-
turing represents a negative factor for the future 
profitability of these entities if our positive correla-
tion between administrative costs, including person-
nel, and interest margin remains in the future. 
3.2.5. Extraordinary results. The result obtained for 
the coefficient on the sale of assets, a variable that 
has received little or no attention in the literature, 
seems also very informative. It has proved to be 
significant and with a negative sign, with a coeffi-
cient of -0.107. This means that the greater the 
yields obtained from these purchasing and selling of 
non-ordinary assets the lower the interest margin. 
When the non-financial activities provide significant 
amounts of yields, as happens over the growth pe-
riods, credit entities can shorten interest margins.  
3.2.6. Quality of the entity. The variable measuring 
the delinquency rate has also proved to be signifi-
cant and with a negative sign, with a coefficient of -
0.031. Higher ratios are significantly associated with 
lower interest margins. An increase in the delin-
quency ratio means that some interest rates from 
debtors will not be realized, which negatively affects 
the interest margin finally obtained. 
As previously mentioned, another singular variable 
that is often mentioned in the literature, but not tested, 
is the one referring to the quality of assets measured 
according to their risk. In our case, this variable has 
proved to be significant and with a negative sign, so 
that the lower the ratio (less risk or higher quality of 
assets), the higher the interest margin.  
The leverage rate is another singular variable here 
tested that has received little attention in the lite-
rature. In our research it has proved to be signifi-
cant and with a positive sign, so a higher leverage 
rate is associated with a greater interest margin. 
However, an increase of this rate also increases 
some other risks confronted by the credit entities 
when circumstances get suddenly altered and 
these entities cannot renew their external funding 
from international wholesale markets or when 
their assets drastically see their market value re-
duced, for example. This is exactly what has hap-
pened in the case of several Spanish saving banks 
since the 2008 financial crash. Of course, the risks 
associated to higher leverage rates are lower, as 
higher is the quality of assets of those credit enti-
ties accessing international financial markets. 
3.2.7. External macro variables and micro va-
riables. Regarding the external variables. First, the 
Consumer Price Index has proved to be non-
significant, though with a positive sign. Regarding 
the Euribor, it has shown to be significant and with a 
positive sign, as expected. Therefore, the higher the 
Euribor, the greater the interest margin of Spanish 
credit institutions. Finally, concerning GDP, our 
study shows a negative sign and a significant varia-
ble. This sign of the coefficient has also been found 
by Carbo et al. (2007), Claeys and Vennet (2008), as 
well as Kasman et al. (2010) and Tarus et al. (2012). 
Over periods with significant GDP growth, credit 
entities may decide to reward deposits with higher 
interest rates to capture more savings to meet the 
increased demand for credits they receive over those 
years, and may also reduce the interest rate charged 
on loans because of the lower delinquency rate.  
The variable that measures market power has proved 
to be significant and with a positive sign: an increase 
in market power translates into an increase in inte-
rest margin.  
Although these variables might have been included 
in the model as control variables, we decided not to 
proceed that way and treat them instead as potential 
determinants in order to study the effect of interac-
tions. We have done so when searching for differ-
ences between banks and savings banks. Our results 
are in line with expectations. 
3.3. Differences between banks and savings banks. 
Through our model with interactions, we have found 
that seven variables are significant. This means that in 
our sample, a similar variation in the regress or does 
not produce the same impact on the interest margin of 
the banks than that of savings banks. For five of these 
variables, the impact appears greater in the case of 
savings banks. Only in two cases, the impact is greater 
for banks than for savings banks. 
Two income variables are relevant and with a nega-
tive sign: yields from financial operations and other 
operating income. This means that a similar increase 
of these two variables in our sample produces a 
sharper decrease in the case of savings banks than in 
banks. In the case of other operating income, the 
coefficient is quite important (0.581), which means 
that a similar increase in this variable results in a 
decrease of the interest margin 58% higher for  
savings banks than for banks.  
Concerning those determinants linked to expendi-
tures-costs, in our model with interactions, the costs 
of administration are significant, but with a positive 
sign. Therefore, a similar increase in these costs in 
our sample results in a greater increase of the inter-
est rate in banks than in savings banks. As the coef-
ficient is about 0.919, this increase is almost a hun-
dred per cent higher in the case of banks. The effi-
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ciency variable has proved to be significant and with 
a negative sign. Lower efficiency ratios are asso-
ciated with greater decreases in the interest margin 
in savings banks than in banks. 
Regarding the external factors, GDP growth has been 
significant and with a negative sign. In this case, an 
increase of GDP is significantly associated with a 
greater reduction of interest margin in the case of sav-
ings banks. Finally, two variables have proved to be 
statistically significant too, regarding the internal va-
riables tested. In the case of market power, the sign is 
positive, so higher market power levels in our sample 
get associated with higher interest margins too, but the 
impact is higher again for banks than for savings 
banks. However, the variable referring to size has re-
sulted in a negative sign, so an increase in the size of 
credit institutions gets associated with a bigger de-
crease of interest margin in the case of savings banks.  
Therefore, the above results clearly indicate that in 
our sample there are significant differences regard-
ing the impact each determinant has upon savings 
banks and banks regarding their interest margins.  
Conclusion 
The financial crash that took place in 2007–2008 and 
the subsequent economic recession has led many credit 
institutions worldwide to bankruptcy or to be bailed-
out and restructured or merged. This has also affected 
the weight interest margin has on total income. 
Though we have followed Ho and Saunders (1981), 
the model here developed has included three singu-
lar determinants that have received little attention in 
the literature: their rate of leverage, the quality of 
their total assets measured according to their risk, 
and the profit obtained from the selling of assets, 
including real state ones. We have also found some 
differences regarding banks and savings banks. The 
following are our main concluding remarks. 
Concerning the management of the balance sheet, 
the most important conclusion obtained is that the 
change in strategy implemented by the Spanish cre-
dit institutions since the mid-1990s (in an attempt to 
keep their high rate of growth thanks to a greater 
access to the international wholesale financing) led 
them to experience a lower interest margin and, 
consequently, lower profitability over the years stu-
died. Now that the economy seems to be initiating a 
new, though very incipient, recovering phase at na-
tional and international levels, paying attention to 
our findings and advancing some regulatory meas-
ures to prevent such over financing at international 
wholesale markets seems quite reasonable. 
Concerning the degree of diversification of income 
sources, our research allows us to find that greater 
diversification gets significantly correlated with 
lower interest margins. The coefficients of the four 
types of incomes included in this variable indicate 
that the more the income Spanish entities get from 
non-traditional lending sources the lower the interest 
margin. As shorter interest margins mean greater 
competitiveness on the part of these financial enti-
ties in doing their intermediary functions for channe-
ling savings to investments, greater diversification 
of sources has meant in the Spanish case lower in-
terest rates charged to borrowers.  
As known, the restructuring of credit institutions 
made in Spain, as well as in other EU countries, 
required those entities, which got some financial aid 
to disinvest in non-lending traditional activities, and 
particularly in real estate assets. As a result, our 
study allows us also to predict that in the coming 
years, once the recession gets finally passed, these 
entities will not be able to get again the significant 
amount of income they got from this source before 
2008. Interest margin will see its share of total in-
come increased. Their profitability will depend more 
heavily on their traditional lending operations and 
the cost savings they are able to achieve. If this 
process finally ends in higher interest margins, this 
could impact negatively on their competitiveness 
and the interest rates they charge to borrowers, 
though this result is not inevitable, of course. 
Our research has also allowed us to conclude that 
higher administrative costs, including personnel, are 
significantly correlated with higher interest margins. 
As the restructuring process is also leading to a sig-
nificant  reduction in personnel and other operating 
costs, these cost saving measures might serve to 
moderate the above mentioned expected increase in 
interest margins and interest rates once solvent de-
mand for credit significantly recovers itself. As 
mentioned in the paper, we can also conclude that 
this intensive reduction in personnel costs may lead 
to two different scenarios in the coming years. On 
the one hand, the reduction of such costs does in fact 
help to reduce interest rates charged to credits, even 
with a similar interest margin, then, contributing to 
increase competitiveness of the Spanish economy, as 
firms may obtain external financial resources at a 
lower cost. On the other hand, the significant reduc-
tion in jobs as a result of bailouts and restructuring 
represents a negative factor in the medium term, if 
our positive correlation between the evolution of 
administrative costs, including personnel, and the 
evolution of interest margin remains in the future. 
If we take into account that the delinquency ratio of 
Spanish credit institutions is increasing very rapidly, 
our study also allows us to stress that this factor may 
be impacting negatively upon their interest margin. 
The quality of assets, measured according to their 
risk, has also proved to be a significant determinant. 
Banks and Bank Systems, Volume 12, Issue 2, 2017 
47 
The lower this ratio (higher quality of assets), the 
greater the associated interest margin. The losses 
resulting from these risky assets (even if interest 
rates charged are higher) seem to be more important 
for interest margins and profitability than the impact 
derived from the lower interest rates that are charged 
to less risky assets.  
Though a high and increasing leverage rate on the part 
of the credit entities is often considered as a key factor 
influencing the severity of any financial crisis, our 
study allows us to qualify the argument, because the 
consequences of a specific leverage rate depend on a 
variable that has in fact been taken into account in our 
study with relevant results. This variable is the risk 
associated to each leverage rate, which is inversely 
dependent on the quality of assets measured with the 
usual risk weighted assets ratio. Our study shows that 
an increase in this ratio is positively associated with an 
increase in interest margin. Therefore, a similar in-
crease in the leverage ratio of credit entities will influ-
ence less negatively over the crisis periods, as higher is 
the quality of assets of these entities, ceteris paribus. 
The external variables (those that might have been ta-
ken as control variables, but were not for the reason 
already mentioned) impact as expected. Higher interest 
rates, higher GDP rate of growth and higher market 
power get positively associated with higher interest 
margin in our study over the period examined. By con-
trast, an increase in the size of the activities gets posi-
tively associated with a lower interest margin, which is 
consistent with the well-known economies of scale. 
Finally, the study also indicates that the structure 
of ownership (savings bank versus bank) is also a 
relevant determinant. The banks in our sample 
present a higher interest margin than the savings 
banks. In fact, in our model with interactions, all 
variables that have a significant and negative cor-
relation with the interest margin (yields from fi-
nancial operations, other operating income, effi-
ciency ratio, GDP rate of growth, and size of the 
entity) show (negative) greater correlation impact 
on the interest margin of savings banks than in 
that of banks. On the contrary, for the two va-
riables (administrative costs, including staff, and 
market power) in which a significant and positive 
correlation exists, we have found that the impact 
regarding interest margins is greater (and positive) 
for banks than for savings banks.  
These results are consistent with the fact that in 
Spain, most of the financial aid used for bailouts 
and restructuring of the financial system has been 
directed to the savings banks. As mentioned, we 
are not alone regarding these differential impacts 
the financial crisis has produced upon banks and 
savings banks, as they have also been found by 
other authors. In a context of more and more com-
petitive global financial markets, the future profita-
bility of this type of entities is at greater risk. 
Therefore, our results may be of particular interest 
for those countries where entities similar to the 
Spanish savings banks still have a significant mar-
ket share, as is the case of Germany, for instance.  
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Saving bank – bank = b b b b b b b s - b b 
National - foreign e e n e e 
 Balance 
sheet  
Liquidity/total assets ¿ - - - - + + (+) + + + - + - + + (-) + + + (+) (+) (+) + - - - - - + (-) - - (-) - - - (+) (-) C 
Loans / total assets - + + + - + - + + (+) + + + ¿ (+) + + + + + - - - - + (+) (+) B 
Deposits / total assets + + + (+) (+) (-) + + (+) B 
Own funds / total assets + - (+) + (+) - + + + (+) (+) + (+) - + - + + (+) (+) (+) + + - + + + + - + + (-) + + - (-) + + + + + + + + + + + + + + ¿ (+) (+) B 
Incomes  
Capital yields /total 
assets 
- - (+) B 
Net commissions/total 
assets  
(+) - (-) - (+) - 
   
¿ - (+) B 
Yields from financial 
operations/t.a.  
(-) - - - - - S 
Other operating 
income/total assets  
- - (-) - - - S 
Implicit interest 
payments:   
+ + + (+) - (+) (+) (+) + + + + + + + + 
   
+ - 
   







+ + + + + + + + + (+) 
   
+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + - - - - + + + + B 
Efficiency ratio  + + (+) (-) - - - - - - + - - (-) - + - - - + - - - - + (+) (-) - - - S 
Ext. results 
Yields from the sale of 
assets/t.a.  





+ + (+) (-) + + (-) (+) (-) - + + + + + + (-) (+) - + (+) - - - + + (+) + (+) + (+) + ¿ - (-) S 
Risk weighted assets + - (-) S 
Leverage ratio ¿ + (+) B 
External 
Consumer Price Index + (-) (-) (+) + + (+) + + + (+) + (+) + ¿ (+) (+) B 
Interest rate  + + + + - + + + (+) + + + + (-) + + + - (+) + + (+) B 
GDP rate of growth + (+) (+) (+) - + (-) - + + (+) + - (+) - (+) (+) + - - S 
Micro 
variables 
Market power - +
 
+ + + + + + (-) - + - (+) (+) (-) (+) (-) + + + + (+) + + + - (-) + (-) - - + + + + + + + + B 
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